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presents a comprehensive review of positive theories and their empirical evidence regarding the con-
tribution of corporate risk management to shareholder value. It is argued that because of realistic 
capital market imperfections, such as agency costs, transaction costs, taxes, and increasing costs of 
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1 Introduction and Overview 
Due to at times higher volatility in the international financial markets and spectacular cases of deriva-
tives losses, risk management has recently gained increasing attention -- by practitioners as well as in 
the academic profession. As a matter of fact, the successful management of financial risks has ad-
vanced to a crucial competitive advantage for firms in all industrial sectors. Financial risks are typi-
cally understood as foreign exchange and interest rate risk. In a ddition, commodity price risk is 
sometimes considered in this context as well, as there exist many instruments in the financial markets 
with commodity prices as underlying assets, which can be used to efficiently transfer commodity 
price risk to other market participants. 
Despite the current popularity of risk management, there is a broad discussion in the academic 
literature regarding the contribution of risk management to shareholder value. It was triggered by the 
apparent contradiction between corporate practice, where financial risk management gained more 
and more interest, and various economic theories stating that risk management was generally redun-
dant or that it could be performed equally well if not better by the shareholders themselves. As a 
result, this paper analyzes the existing theoretical arguments and empirical evidence of risk manage-
ment as a means to maximize shareholder value. While the question regarding the relationship be-
tween risk management and firm value has been raised for financial institutions as well,1 the focus of 
this paper is on nonfinancial corporations. 
                                                   
1  See e.g. Allen/Santomero (1997), p. 1465.  
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The paper starts out in Section 2 by reviewing the existing empirical evidence with regard to 
the risk management activities of nonfinancial firms, in order to gain insight into current corporate 
practices (e.g. concerning the instruments used or the strategies pursued). 
The analysis comprises the management of foreign exchange rate, interest rate and commodity 
price risk, the development of derivatives markets and the use of these instruments by corporations, 
as well as organizational aspects of corporate risk management. Subsequently, positive theories that 
are concerned with why corporate risk management might contribute to shareholder value are pre-
sented in Section 3. It is argued that because of realistic capital market imperfections, such as agency 
costs, transaction costs, taxes, and increasing costs of external financing, risk management at the firm 
level (as opposed to risk management by stock owners) represents a means to increase firm value to 
the benefit of the shareholders. The various theoretical arguments are complemented in turn by the 
existing empirical evidence concerning the link between risk management at the firm level and firm 
value maximization. 
The paper offers a more comprehensive review of the literature than presented in previous 
work.2 As a matter of fact, it includes a more inclusive list of references regarding the theoretical 
arguments and, in particular, with regard to the empirical evidence of the different hedging motives. 
Moreover, the review is supplemented by an extensive and detailed presentation of the existing inter-
national evidence on corporate risk management practices in general and the use of derivatives in 
particular. Section 4 summarizes and concludes the analysis. 
                                                   
2  See e.g. Stulz (2000a), Ch. 3, Raposo (1999), Smithson (1998), Ch. 20, Allen/Santomero (1997), Santomero (1995), 
Smith (1995), Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990a).  
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2 Risk Management Practices of Nonfinancial Corporations 
2.1  Derivatives Use and General Risk Management Practices 
Comprehensive statistics concerning the use of risk management instruments exist especially for 
derivatives, which have become increasingly popular risk management tools. As a result, statistics 
such as trading volume (turnover in number of contracts) or the notional amount outstanding (in 
USD) document an exponentially increasing use of these instruments since the early 1980s.3 By these 
measures, the global derivatives market has grown worldwide almost by a factor of 60 during the 
period 1986-98 and reached a market value of USD 63 trillion by the end of 1998 (Figure 1). This 
expansive development, which has been apparent for exchange-traded and -- even stronger -- for 
OTC instruments, has largely been driven by the growth of interest rate derivatives in both market 
segments. At the end of 1998, the BIS estimated the OTC market for foreign exchange, interest rate 
and commodity instruments as having a market value of USD 51 trillion.4 
[Figure 1] 
Interest rate derivatives -- in particular interest rate futures and OTC interest rate swaps -- ex-
hibited the biggest growth (Figure 2). The notional amount outstanding of exchange-traded interest 
rate instruments increased from USD 516.5 billion in 1986 to more than USD 12.3 trillion in 1998, 
and the turnover of the number of contracts grew on average by 18% per year (Figure 3). For inter-
est rate swaps, the notional principal outstanding increased even more strongly from USD 1,010 
                                                   
3  These developments are also described, for example, in Allen/Santomero (1998), Remolona (1992-93), Saunders 
(1994), p. 6, Economist (1996), pp. 6-10, and Handelsblatt (1997). 
4  BIS (2000), Remolona (1992-93), p. 28.  
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billion (1988) to USD 6.2 trillion (1993) and USD 39.8 trillion (1998), or by 44% per year on aver-
age. OTC interest rate options were less important in terms of the trading volume, but showed similar 
growth rates for notional amounts outstanding. 
[Figure 2] 
In comparison, the number of exchange-traded currency derivatives increased on average by 
only 5.1% per year over the period 1988-98, except for currency swaps which showed growth 
rates similar to interest rate instruments. At the same time, the notional amounts outstanding of cur-
rency swaps increased between 1988 and 1998 from USD 320 billion to USD 2,470 billion. By the 
number of contracts, however, interest rate derivatives are still much more important. 
[Figure 3] 
Hedging instruments for commodity price risk are playing a more important role as well. This 
observation is documented by, among others, the trading volume of commodity futures and options 
contracts (Figure 3 and Table 1). At the end of 1999, the notional principal outstanding was esti-
mated at USD 281 billion for commodity price forwards and swaps, and USD 267 billion for com-
modity price options.5 The most popular underlyings are energy prices for swaps and metal prices 
for options. While exchange-traded instruments are often used for base metals, OTC volumes still 
significantly exceed exchange-traded volumes in precious metals and energy markets. As a result, the 
presented data on exchange-traded transactions underestimates the growth of these commodities, 
because a large proportion of market volume is traded over the counter.6 
                                                   
5  BIS (2000), p. 84. 
6  JPMorgan (1994), p. 12, Global Derivatives Study Group (1993), p. 57.  
  5
[Table 1] 
The above trading statistics reflect the extended supply of derivatives as well as the increased 
use of these instruments by market participants. Since derivatives are, however, most likely to be 
used by financial institutions, it is not possible to draw immediate conclusions from this data regarding 
the risk management practices of nonfinancial institutions. To illustrate, financial institutions account 
for 82% of the OTC market volume.7 
Insights into the use of derivatives in particular and risk management practices in general can 
be gained to some degree from corporate annual reports as well as risk management survey studies. 
The analysis of information in annual reports concerning the use of derivatives shows that nonfinancial 
firms utilize derivatives more often and to a larger degree over time.8 According to survey results, 
50% of U.S. nonfinancial firms used derivatives in 1998. At the same time, derivatives use is posi-
tively correlated with firm size: 83% of large companies (total sales > USD 1.2 billion), but only 12% 
of small companies (total sales < USD 150 million) make use of derivative financial instruments.9 
                                                   
7  Allen/Santomero (1998), p. 1470. 
8  Hentschel/Kothari (1997), p. 9. 
9  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 71, Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1996), p. 114, Bodnar et al. (1995), p. 104, Phillips 
(1995), p. 117. Other studies find percentages of 37% (Guay (1999), p. 328), 59.1% for large firms (Gé-
czy/Minton/Schrand (1997), p. 1335), 63.2% for all TMA member companies (Phillips (1995), p. 115), 60% for 
large U.S. firms (Hentschel/Kothari (1997), p. 32), 44% for all S&P companies (Allayannis/Ofek (1996), p. 4), 
85.2% for Fortune 500 companies (Dolde (1993b), p. 34) or 57.8% for large U.S. companies (Goldberg et al. 
(1994), p. 21). Firms in New Zealand exhibit a user rate for derivatives of 48% (Berkman/Bradbury/Magan (1997), 
p. 69) or 53.1% (Berkman/Bradbury (1996)). In 1997, the percentage of German nonfinancial firms using deriva-
tives was reported to be 77.8% and was therefore significantly higher than for U.S. firms (Bodnar/Gebhardt 
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Moreover, the use of derivatives varies across industries as well: 68% of primary product 
producers, 48% of manufacturing companies, and 42% of firms in the service industry employ these 
instruments. Of the companies that utilize derivatives, changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates 
and commodity prices are a relevant source of risk for 83%, 76% and 56%, respectively. 10 Many 
firms perceive several risks as simultaneously important (Figure 4).11 At the same time, there is a 
positive relationship between firm size and the perception of financial risk exposures. 
[Figure 4] 
With regard to the type of hedging instrument, forwards (72%) and OTC options (37%) are 
more commonly employed than exchange-traded futures and options (17% and 14%, respectively). 
While 68% of all U.S. nonfinancial firms use some type of option, the percentage is much higher for 
large firms (74%) than for small firms (47%).12 Moreover, there are indications that large multina-
tionals use more complex, exotic derivatives as well (such as knock-out options or quanto swaps), 
however they do so less frequently and rather with experimental intention. To illustrate, a study by 
                                                   
(1999), p. 5). 
10  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 73. A study by the Economist Intelligence Unit results in 92.2% (exchange rate 
risk), 81.1% (interest rate risk) and 46.0% (commodity price risk) (Corporate Finance (1995), p. 6). According to 
results of the Group of Thirty, companies use derivatives to hedge foreign exchange rate transaction exposures 
(69%), foreign exchange translation exposures (33%), interest rate exposure (78%) and commodity price expo-
sure (11%) (Global Derivatives Study Group (1993), pp. 37-38). German firms use derivatives primarily to man-
age foreign exchange rate risk (95.9%) and interest rate risk (88.8%), while only about 40% use these instru-
ments to manage commodity price risk (Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 7). 
11  Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 8, Phillips (1995), p. 116. 
12  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 82.  
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the Group of Thirty finds that 4% of the end-users of derivatives use quanto swaps, while another 
14% intend to do so in the future.13 
In general, nonfinancial corporations typically focus their financial risk management with de-
rivatives on short time horizons. Consequently, derivatives are most often employed to target 
transaction exposures (80%), and to hedge anticipated short-term transactions (77%). Only 16% of 
nonfinancial firms aim frequently to reduce their economic exposure, another 24% do so 
occasionally, and anticipated long-term transactions (> 12 months) are hedged with derivatives by 
only 50% of the firms. 44% of nonfinancial firms still concentrate on accounting exposure, and 43% 
use d erivatives for taking a view, i.e. speculating, in order to reduce funding costs. On the other 
hand, the most important objective of the hedging strategy consists for 67% of minimizing fluctuations 
in cash flow, while reducing the volatility of accounting earnings or protecting the appearance of the 
balance sheet are predominant only for 28% and 5%, respectively. A high percentage (23.9%) of 
U.S. nonfinancial firms even consider firm value not important as a risk management objective.14 
2.2  Management of Foreign Exchange Rate Risk 
If surveys on risk management practices capture a v alid picture of actual firm behavior, their results 
lead to the conclusion that nonfinancial firms conduct foreign exchange risk management activities 
primarily to hedge transaction risk and that only few large multinationals try to reduce their economic 
                                                   
13  Euromoney (1994). 
14  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1996), pp. 116-121, Bodnar et al. (1995), pp. 107-109. In contrast, the most important 
objective of the hedging strategy for German nonfinancial firms is accounting earnings (55.3%), while cash 
flows (34.0%) and firm value (11.7%) are less important (Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 9).  
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foreign exchange rate risk. Overall, 96% of all firms hedge their transaction exposure completely 
(35%) or partially (61%), while 52% hedge their economic foreign exchange rate exposure, which 
only 9% eliminate completely (Figure 5).15 
[Figure 5] 
In contrast to these international results, the economic exposure -- even though still less impor-
tant than the transaction exposure -- has become more important than the accounting exposure for 
nonfinancial firms in the U.S.16 Nevertheless, U.S. firms focus their risk management on near-term, 
directly observable exposures as well.17 And even though one third of the firms believe that they face 
economic exposures, only few conduct sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of different risk 
management strategies on c orporate performance. Especially in cases in which the exposure is de-
                                                   
15  Price Waterhouse (1995), p. 14. In the study of 36 U.S. multinational firms by Malindretos/Tsanacas (1995), 
transaction exposures, economic exposures and accounting exposures are perceived as the most important 
concept by 68%, 27% and 11%, respectively. According to a study of 200 multinationals by the Bank of Amer-
ica, 15% of the firms hedge economic risks, 75% hedge anticipated risks, and 95% hedge their transaction risks 
(World of Banking 1995). In Australia, the percentage of firms that hedge their economic foreign exchange rate 
risk is 16.6% (Batten/Mellor/Wan (1993), p. 564). In Switzerland, 28% of the nonfinancial firms aim to protect 
firm value directly (and firm value is the most important risk management target for only 1%), while 61% hedge 
individual foreign exchange transactions (Loderer/Pichler (2000), pp. 25-26). 
16  Jesswein/Kwok/Folks (1995), p. 108. An earlier study by Stanley/Block (1978) reports a percentage of 52% of all 
firms that hedge their accounting exposure, even though 23.2% indicate that this increased their economic ex-
posure. 
17  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 76.  
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termined by several economic factors, corporations do not see themselves as being in a position to 
manage their economic exposure.18 
The short-term risk management perspective is also reflected in the maturity structure of cor-
porate hedging. Derivatives with a maturity of up to 180 days are most commonly used, and firms 
apparently concentrate most of their utilization of derivatives on hedging foreign currency exposures 
over short horizons.19 Interestingly, most firms use derivatives to hedge only part of the foreign ex-
change rate exposure they perceive. Similarly, a large number of U.S. nonfinancial firms indicate that 
they incorporate their market view into the hedging decision: The timing and the size of the hedge is 
altered at least sometimes by 59% and 61% of U.S. nonfinancial firms, respectively, and 32% ac-
tively take positions frequently or occasionally.20 
Overall, 41.4% of all nonfinancial firms use derivatives to manage foreign exchange rate risk,21 
and there is a positive relationship between the use of derivatives and foreign activities (e.g. foreign 
                                                   
18  Price Waterhouse (1995), pp. 14-17. 
19  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 77. 
20  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 79. According to results by Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 17, German firms are 
even more inclined to take a view on the market, as altering the timing of the hedge (88.8%), adjusting the size 
of the hedge (84.3%), and actively taking positions (50.6%) at least sometimes appears common practice. 77% 
of Swiss nonfinancial firms always or often have a view on the market, and 63% use their view as the basis for 
their hedging decision (Loderer/Pichler (2000), p. 18). 
21  Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), p. 1335. Allayannis/Weston (1997), p. 12, report 59% in 1995 with an increasing 
trend, Goldberg et al. (1994), p. 12, find a percentage of 38.8% of foreign exchange derivatives users. In Switzer-
land, this percentage is, at 77%, much higher (Loderer/Pichler (2000), p. 26).  
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sales).22 Corporations primarily use OTC forward contracts (90%) and spot foreign exchange trans-
actions (83%), but also OTC options and swaps (50%).23 Mostly large firms take advantage of the 
tailoring of derivatives contracts in the OTC market. In contrast, exchange-traded contracts such as 
currency futures and options are used much less often, presumably due to the lower flexibility of 
these contracts. In addition, foreign currency debt and other internal hedging tools such as matching 
are employed -- as substitutes for derivatives -- to hedge foreign business activities.24 
For the hedging of accounting exposures, foreign currency debt and currency forwards sup-
posedly represent by far the most popular risk management instruments. In contrast, the economic 
foreign exchange rate exposure is managed in smaller firms primarily by matching and netting cash 
                                                   
22  Makar/Huffman (1997), Allayannis/Ofek (1996). Similarly, Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), p. 1340, find a signifi-
cant, positive correlation between proxies for the foreign exchange rate exposure (foreign income, foreign cur-
rency debt, import penetration) and the use of derivatives. In the same vein, Berkman/Bradbury (1999) provide 
empirical evidence for foreign exchange derivatives being used to reduce the cash flow exposure of New Zea-
land firms. 
23  Price Waterhouse (1995), p. 14. Similar results are presented in Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 15, for U.S. and Ger-
man nonfinancial firms, as well as in Loderer/Pichler (2000), p. 26, for Swiss corporations. According to a sur-
vey by the Group of Thirty, 78% of the firms studied use currency forwards, 64% currency swaps and 31% cur-
rency options (Global Derivatives Study Group (1993), pp. 34-36). The survey by Hak-
karainen/Kasanen/Puttonen (1994) results in more than 80% of the studied Finnish firms using currency for-
wards. 
24  Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), p. 1324, Hakkarainen/Kasanen/Puttonen (1994), p. 35.  
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flows, while larger corporations employ derivatives more often as well.25 Only a few firms use com-
plex foreign exchange rate derivatives (compound options, break forwards, hindsight options, etc.).26 
2.3  Management of Interest Rate Risk 
Based on the results of an international survey of nonfinancial corporations in 1995, the majority of 
these firms that were surveyed (73%) use interest rate derivatives.27 The type of i nstrument used 
depends on the risk management strategy pursued. Firms who actively manage interest rate risk typi-
cally use a much wider variety of derivatives than firms who try to hedge their risk exposure. Never-
theless, even firms who hedge their interest rate risk frequently hedge their exposure only partially 
(Figure 6). Similarly, many U.S. nonfinancial firms indicate that they alter the timing of a hedge 
(66%), to adjust the size of a hedge (59%), or actively take positions (41%) depending on their 
market view.28 
                                                   
25  Price Waterhouse (1995), p. 14. 
26  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 82, Bodnar et al. (1995), p. 106, Jesswein/Kwok/Folks (1995), p. 107. 
27  Price Waterhouse (1995), p. 12. Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p 73, and Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1996), p. 115, 
report 76% and 73%, respectively, of U.S. nonfinancial derivatives users employing interest rate derivatives. 
These results are in stark contrast to the analysis of annual reports of U.S. corporations by the Federal Reserve 
Bank, which results in a percentage of 9.1% of the firms that use interest rate derivatives (Perlmuth (1996)). This 
discrepancy can be explained partially by accounting rules. Goldberg et al. (1994), p. 12, report 41.6% of the 
firms in their study using interest rate derivatives. In 1985, this percentage was only 19.2% (Block/Gallagher 
(1986), p. 75). 
28  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1988), p. 81. As with foreign exchange rate risk, German firms exhibit a higher inclination 




In general, for interest rate risk management, (U.S.) nonfinancial firms employ swaps more 
frequently than other instruments such as caps, futures, forwards or options. Interestingly, the size of 
the firm does not seem to matter for the use of contracts with option features.29 
Apparently, interest rate derivates are used more often by transportation, construction and util-
ity companies, as well as by firms with high credit ratings. Moreover, firms with a high proportion of 
short-term and floating rate debt seem to be frequent users of interest rate derivatives. These instru-
ments are primarily employed to convert floating r ate payments into fixed rate payments, and less 
frequently to swap from fixed to floating, to lock in the rate or spread on new debt issues, or to re-
duce costs based upon a market view.30 In contrast, there appears to be no empirical correlation 
between capital expenditures or annual operating earnings and the use of interest rate derivatives, 
                                                   
or change the size of the hedge, respectively, while 26.1% actively take positions (Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 
20). 
29  Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 19, Perlmuth (1996), Bodnar et al. (1995), p. 106, Phillips (1995), p. 119. However, 
there are discrepancies across countries: Dutch firms use more FRAs and interest rate options than interest 
rate swaps, while Swedish companies frequently use interest rate futures (82%) (Price Waterhouse (1995), p. 
12). A study by the Group of Thirty indicates that 87% of the firms use interest rate swaps and 40% use inter-
est rate options (Global Derivatives Study Group (1993), p. 34). 
30  Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 18, Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 80, Dayal (1992). This result fits with the obser-
vation that the goal of interest rate risk management consists often in stabilizing the cost of capital 
(Goswami/Shrikhande (1997), p. 21, Dolde (1993a), p. 22). Consequently, nonfinancial institutions typically take 
the position of fixed rate payers of interest rate swaps (Wall/Pringle (1989), p. 66).  
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which are primarily employed to reduce the accounting exposure (interest rate risk of liabilities), but 
not the economic interest rate exposure. 31 
2.4  Management of Commodity Price Risk 
Only a few nonfinancial firms (11%) use commodity price derivatives to manage energy or raw 
material costs.32 This percentage is, at 77%, much higher however, is much larger (84.6%) for firms 
in the energy sector (and most likely other commodity-based industries).33 In general, risk manage-
ment surveys document no strong preferences or common practices of U.S. nonfinancial firms 
regarding the use of derivatives to manage commodity price risk. While corporations use a variety of 
different commodity derivatives, forward contracts are apparently utilized slightly more often than 
futures, options and swaps: More than 50% of nonfinancial firms employ forwards, f utures and 
swaps, and 45% also use OTC options. Overall, commodity f utures are regarded as t he most 
important derivative for commodity price risk management.34  
In spite of the expansive growth of markets for traded commodities, one has to be taken into 
account for risk management activities that these markets still do not compare to established financial 
                                                   
31  Perlmuth (1996). 
32  Global Derivatives Study Group (1993), p. 38. Hentschel/Kothari (1997) find 4.7% of U.S. nonfinancial firms 
using commodity price derivatives. 
33  Thornton/Welker (1999). 
34  Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 20, Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1996), p. 115, Bodnar et al. (1995), p. 106, Phillips (1995), 
p. 119. German nonfinancial firms  seem to be using primarily commodity price forwards (50%), less than a third 
use futures and swaps (Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 21).  
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markets in terms of liquidity -- especially for contracts with longer maturity. Consequently, the limited 
depth and breadth of commodity markets possibly represent a constraint for practical risk manage-
ment purposes.35 To illustrate, at the end of  1999, the notional principal outstanding amounted to 
USD 14,344 billion for foreign exchange rate contracts, USD 60,091 billion for interest rate con-
tracts, and USD 548 billion for commodity contracts in the OTC market.36 By the same token, sur-
veys of financial risk management of U.S. corporations show that the use of commodity price deriva-
tives is less popular compared to currency and interest rate instruments.37 
Industry-specific studies offer insight into the practices of commodity risk management in se-
lected nonfinancial industry sectors. Several studies investigate the way firms in the North American 
gold mining industry manage their gold price risk. This analysis is facilitated by the fact that the output 
of these firms is a globally traded, volatile commodity. Gold mining firms thus exhibit a common and 
clear exposure, which they can manage with an ample variety of instruments (e.g. forwards, futures, 
swaps, options, gold loans, spot deferred contracts) and operating decisions. Firms cover 25.6% of 
their production on average (median 22.9%). Nevertheless, there exist substantial differences in risk 
                                                   
35  UNCTAD (1994), p. 22. 
36  BIS (2000), p. 81. With regard to derivative financial instruments traded on organized exchanges, the compari-
son is not feasible since there are no notional amounts outstanding available for commodity contracts on a 
global scale. The number of exchange-traded futures (options) contract outstanding at the end of 1999 were 
17.5 (5.6) million for interest rate instruments, 0.7 (0.5) million for currency contracts, and 6.5 (3.6) million for 
commodity contracts. Furthermore, the turnover of futures (options) contracts in 1999 totaled 672.7 (118.0) mil-
lion for interest rate contracts, 37.1 (6.8) million for currency contracts, and 327.5 (41.4) million for commodity 
price contracts. 
37  Hentschel/Kothari (1997), p. 11.  
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management practices within the industry, as 14.6% sell all of their output at spot prices, but 16.8% 
hedge 40 percent or more of their projected output. Three quarters of firms that manage their gold 
price risk use options for at least part of their activities, and on average 16.1% of the firms' portfolio 
delta originates from option positions.38 
Similarly, the management of commodity price risk is studied in the U.S. natural gas industry, 
which faced increased gas price risk as the result of the deregulation process. The analysis shows 
that natural gas companies responded to this development by increasing diversification and use of 
derivatives. While 19% of the companies used commodity derivatives in 1992, this percentage had 
increased to 85% by 1995.39 Alternative hedging strategies consist of holding internal cash and stor-
ing gas underground. While these two activities are complements, they are apparently substitutes for 
employing financial derivatives.40 
For oil and gas producers, commodity price swaps are the most commonly used derivatives 
(50.8%). Fixed price contracts (40.4%) and futures/forwards (37.0%) are popular hedging instru-
ments as well. Conversely, options are only rarely used (10.5%). At the same time, there is substan-
tial variation in the fraction of production hedged across firms in this industry.41 
The power industry faces the challenge that electricity cannot be stored economically. There-
fore, inventories cannot be used to smooth supply or demand shocks, and spot prices are quite vola-
                                                   
38  Tufano (1988), Petersen/Thiagarajan (1997), Tufano (1996). 
39  Haushalter (1997) reports a fraction of 58% of oil and gas producers using commodity derivatives in 1994. 
40  Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1999). 
41  Haushalter (1997), p. 16.  
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tile (and positively skewed). Daytime power prices are typically considerably higher than nighttime 
delivery prices, and there exist significant seasonal variations as w ell. Power producing firms and 
power retailers, however, can hedge their power price risk, for example, with power derivatives 
(forwards, futures, etc.), taking into account the forecasted output and the properties of power de-
mand (skewness, interaction between local and global power demand, etc.).42 
2.5  Risk Management Organization 
A centralized organizational structure is most frequently implemented for the management of foreign 
exchange rate risk (89%), interest rate risk (94%), and commodity price risk (67%). Conversely, 
decentralization -- possibly with centralized coordination  -- is not a common risk management ap-
proach, except for commodity price risk.43 The management of foreign exchange rate risk and inter-
est rate risk is typically part of the corporate treasury function. Increasingly, commodity price risk is 
becoming a responsibility of the treasury as well, although it has traditionally been handled by the 
purchasing department.44 
According to survey data, two thirds of multinational firms organize their treasury as a service 
center, while it is set up less often as a cost center (19%) or a profit center (7%). On the other hand, 
the majority of these firms (66%) pursue an active risk management, while 28% indicate that they 
hedge their risks completely. Nevertheless, there exist noticeable national differences: Allegedly more 
                                                   
42  Bessembinder/Lemmon (1999). 
43  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 73. 
44  Price Waterhouse (1995), pp. 6-7.  
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than half of nonfinancial firms in France and Norway hedge their risks completely, while more than 
80% of all firms in Sweden, Finland and Hong Kong actively manage their risks.45 
In contrast to the management of interest rate and foreign exchange transaction exposure, for 
which 74% and 87%, respectively, of all firms have formal policies, the management of the economic 
foreign exchange rate exposure is much less formalized (43%).46 However, 79% of U.S. nonfinancial 
firms have a documented corporate policy regarding the use of d erivatives. In addition, nearly all 
firms (96%) have established a policy regarding the counterparty risk for derivatives transactions, 
with the majority requiring at least on an A rating. Furthermore, 50% of the firms report their deriva-
tives activity to the board of directors in a regular fashion.47 
For the revaluation of the derivatives portfolio, which takes place at a daily/weekly (28%), 
monthly (27%), or quarterly (21%) frequency, internal sources are relied upon most.48 A Value at 
Risk (VaR) measure is calculated by 44% of nonfinancial firms, and its use is even more common for 
                                                   
45  Price Waterhouse (1995), pp. 6-10. 
46  Price Waterhouse (1995), pp. 6-10. 
47  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 83-84. While German firms are as likely to have documented policies regarding 
derivatives use as U.S. firms, nonfinancial firms in Germany more often have a set and frequent schedule of re-
porting to the CFO, the board of directors or the supervisory board. Moreover, German firms typically require a 
rating of AA or higher of their derivatives counterparty (Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 22). Swiss nonfinancial 
firms (with/without listing) almost always inform senior managers (93%/91%) and directors (69%/55%), but less 
often stockholders (25%/38%) or other investors about their risk management activities (Loderer/Pichler (2000), 
p. 16). 
48  Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 83-84. As a result of their set reporting schedules, German firms value their 
derivatives portfolios significantly more often than U.S. firms (Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 25).  
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large firms. Stress testing is performed by 45% of nonfinancial derivatives users, and approximately 
20% use duration methods (for interest rate derivatives).49 
In most firms (63.5%), risk management is not a full time activity, while in 13 out of 100 cases 
three or more employees are responsible for this task. The computer system used for risk manage-
ment consists typically of PCs (60.8%), LAN networks (14.7%) or mai nframes (6.9%). Neverthe-
less, 17.6% of all firms allegedly do not use computers in the course of their risk management activi-
ties.50 
3 Positive Theories and Empirical Evidence of Corporate Risk 
Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value Creation 
3.1  Capital Market Imperfections as a Basis for Positive Risk Management 
Theories 
The fact that a significant number of corporations are committing resources to risk management ac-
tivities -- as illustrated in the previous section – is only an indication of the potential of corporate risk 
management to increase firm value. Consequently, this section presents a comprehensive analysis of 
positive theories and their empirical evidence regarding the contribution of corporate risk manage-
ment to shareholder value. Arguments supporting the irrelevance of corporate risk management are 
based on international parity conditions between currencies, interest rates and commodity prices 
(real goods prices), especially the International Fisher Effect (IFE) and Purchasing Power Parity 
                                                   
49  Bodnar/Gebhardt (1999), p. 25, Bodnar/Hayt/Marston (1998), p. 83-84. 
50  Institutional Investor (1994), Dolde (1993a), pp. 25-27.  
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(PPP). Under the assumption of equilibria between foreign exchange rates, interest rates and prices 
for real goods, risk management is obsolete since negative effects of one economic factor are com-
pensated instantly by an offsetting development in another risk factor. 
Empirical studies, however, indicate that these parity conditions at best hold in the long run, 
which is why there exists an economic justification for financial risk management in general.51 But this 
does not indicate who, from an economic point of view, should perform this task -- corporations or 
shareholders. Insight on this issue can be derived from the irrelevance theorem by Modigliani/Miller 
(MM). According to the MM propositions, the capital structure of a firm has no impact on firm value 
if certain, well-defined assumptions hold (complete capital markets without information asymmetries, 
taxes, and transaction costs), since shareholders can always replicate the financia l policies of the firm 
with transactions in the capital markets.52 Therefore, the only possibility to increase firm value con-
sists of the realization of real, positive net present value (NPV) projects. Whether these investment 
projects are f inanced with equity or debt, however, is irrelevant, i.e. the financing decision does not 
increase the value of the firm further.53 
Applying the logic of the MM propositions to corporate risk management, (financial) risk 
management as a financial activity would prima facie not lend itself to increase shareholder value.54 
                                                   
51  Alexius  (1996), Rhim/Khayum/Kim (1996), Froot/Rogoff (1994), Marston (1994), Abuaf/Jorion (1990), 
Adler/Lehmann (1983). 
52  Modigliani/Miller (1958), later Stiglitz (1974), Stiglitz (1969). Modigliani/Miller (1959) take dividends into ac-
count, Modigliani/Miller (1963) add taxes to the analysis. Miller (1988) gives a summary of these articles. 
53  Copeland/Weston (1988), pp. 439-444. 
54  MacMinn (1987b), pp. 1169-1173. See also Baron (1976), p. 259, and Dumas (1978), p. 1023, with regard to for-
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The owners of the firm could perform the management of foreign exchange rate, interest rate and 
commodity price risk as equally well as management, and due to the effect of portfolio diversification 
possibly even better. In addition, shareholders have widely differing preferences, which can be ac-
counted for when hedging individually, but not when hedging at the firm level.55 
Closer inspection, however, reveals that the neoclassic assumptions of the MM propositions 
do not hold in reality. The existing capital market imperfections are, therefore, the basis for various 
positive theories about the economic impact of corporate risk management on firm value, which try 
to explain the prevailing discrepancy between theory and business practice by identifying plausible 
motives for hedging at the firm level.56 
Assuming the standard paradigm of maximizing firm value as the corporate objective, corpo-
rate risk management has to be assessed on the basis of whether and to what degree it contributes to 
this goal by raising shareholder value in the presence of realistic market imperfections.57 Only if the 
increase in value exceeds the cost of hedging and if the value augmentation cannot be realized 
through risk management by the shareholders at lower cost, risk management at the firm level is justi-
fied on economic grounds. Total firm value (VF), i.e. the value of the assets, is formally defined as 
the sum of all expected future net cash flows (NCF) discounted at the cost of capital r: 
                                                   
eign exchange rate risk. 
55  Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), pp. 146-151. 
56  Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), pp. 144, Sercu/Uppal (1995), pp. 456, Smith (1995), pp. 24-27, Culp/Furbush/Kavanagh 
(1994), pp. 73-77. 
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The firm value to the shareholders (V) results from the difference between the value of the as-
sets and the market value of debt (entity approach). Alternatively, shareholder value can be calc u-
lated as the sum of the free cash flows (flow to equity) discounted at the return on equity (equity 
approach).58 Both ways yield the same result if the common assumption of a constant value of debt is 
made. 
According to this formula, firm value can generally be increased by reducing the discount rate 
and/or by enlarging the cash flows. Although in capital budgeting the aspect of risk is often taken into 
account in the choice of the discount rate (as the return on an investment in the same risk class), 
analyses of the impact of corporate risk management on firm value typically look at the expected 
cash flows of the firm. This is primarily due to the fact that the effect of hedging on cash flows is more 
intuitive and easier to illustrate. 
At the same time, the perspective on cash flows avoids the question of the diversifiability of fi-
nancial price risk. If exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price changes are unsystematic and 
thus can be diversified away according to portfolio theory,59 they are not compensated with a posi-
tive risk premium in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).60 In this case, the discount rate can 
                                                   
58  See e.g. Levi (1994), pp. 38-43. 
59  Markowitz (1991), Markowitz (1952). For a good summary of portfolio theory see chapters 7 and 8 in 
Brealey/Myers (1996). 
60  The statements by Stulz (1996), p. 12, Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990a), p. 128, Rawls/Smithson (1990), pp. 9-10, 
Aggarwal/Soenen (1989), p. 61, Shapiro/Titman (1986), p. 216, Lessard (1985), p. 287, Logue/Oldfield (1977), p. 
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only be lowered by corporate risk management, if large sharehol ders (e.g. owners of family busi-
nesses or holders of strategic investment positions) exist that cannot -- or only at a higher cost -- 
diversify their portfolio.61 
In the case that financial risks are (primarily) systematic, they cannot be diversified through the 
construction of portfolios by definition.62 Risk reduction through hedging therefore, entails a reduction 
in expected return at the same time and, thus, corresponds to a movement on the security market 
line.63 The CAPM, however, like the MM propositions, is based on the assumption of perfect capital 
markets,64 exactly the assumption whose validity in reality is questioned in the present context. 
Therefore, it appears more appropriate to account for the impact of corporate risk management in 
the cash flows rather than in the discount rate. 
                                                   
21, seem to reflect this opinion. The results of some empirical studies could be interpreted in this way as well, 
e.g. Jorion (1991). 
61  Stulz (1996), p. 13, Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), pp. 146-151, Vermeulen (1994), p. 4, Blake/Mahady (1991), p. 60, May-
ers/Smith (1990), p. 22, Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990b), pp. 357-361, Mayers/Smith (1982), pp. 283 and 293, 
Booth (1982), p. 36. 
62  The perception of financial risk as systematic factors is proposed e.g. by Oldfield/Santomero (1995), pp. 12-13, 
and Giddy (1977), p. 602. The empirical studies by Dukas/Fatemi/Tavakkol (1996), pp. 182-185, He/Ng/Wu 
(1996), pp. 17-22, Chinn/Frankel (1994), p. 12, Choi/Elyasiani/Kopecky (1992), p. 1001, Dominguez (1987), pp. 91-
120, Brown/Otsuki (1994), pp. 88-92, seem to support this view. According to results by Drummen/Zimmermann 
(1992) and Eun/Resnick (1988) only part of the foreign exchange risk can be diversified. 
63  Smith (1995), p. 24, Levi/Sercu (1991), p. 27, Dufey/Srinivasulu (1983), p. 56. 
64  See e.g. Perridon/Steiner (1995), p. 239.  
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Corporate risk management generally results in a reduction of the volatility of corporate cash 
flows, which leads to a lower variance of firm value (Figure 7).65 This not only means that firm value 
is moving less, but more importantly that low values occur with a smaller probability than without 
hedging. Positive theories of risk management as a lever for shareholder value creation argue, that 
firm value is a concave objective function because of capital market imperfections (such as transac-
tion costs (especially cost of financial distress), agency costs, corporate taxes, and costs of external 
financing). Consequently, a reduced cash flow volatility results in lower costs associated with these 
capital market imperfections, larger cash flows to the owners of the firm, and thus higher expected 
firm value (shift to the right), i.e. E1(V) < E2(V).66 
[Figure 7] 
In general, a concave corporate objective function is a necessary condition for risk manage-
ment at the firm level to create value. However, while the concave objective may indeed be a re-
duced-form representation of capital market imperfections, it may in principle have other reasons as 
well, such as decreasing returns to scale of the production technology. Thus, the objective function 
itself may be concave, or it may be concave due to the effect of some feature of the economic envi-
ronment.67 In either case, the concave property of the objective function is able to explain risk man-
agement practices on the corporate level. The subsequent analysis will focus on different capital mar-
                                                   
65  Similarly Lewent/Kearney (1990), p. 28, Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990a), p. 127, Smith/Smithson/Wilford 
(1990b), p. 357, Rawls/Smithson (1990), p. 7. 
66  Culp/Miller (1995), p. 122, Santomero (1995), p. 2. Erroneous reasons to justify corporate risk management are 
presented e.g. in Sercu/Uppal (1995), p. 462, Levi/Sercu (1991), Dufey/Srinivasulu (1983). 
67  Froot/Stein (1998), Santomero (1995), Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1993).  
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ket imperfections since they are widely used in the literature as a basis for risk management ration-
ales. 
As a caveat, it is important to note that the various positive theories to explain corporate risk 
management rely on different corporate objectives (e.g. firm value, cash flows, pretax income) and 
value systems (market values, cash flows, book values). To illustrate, the corporate tax burden can 
be reduced by hedging pre-tax income, the cost of financial distress can be lowered by hedging total 
cash flow, and investment and financing policies can be coordinated by hedging cash flow before 
investment spending (as will be explained below). 
These activities can, but do not necessarily, work in the same direction. In the face of limited 
hedge accounting for off-balance sheet financial instruments, a risk management activity may, for 
instance, lead to lower volatility of firm value, but higher volatility of earnings.68 Or the use of VaR, a 
common risk management approach, has been shown to lead to undesirable effects such as the reali-
zation of larger losses for VaR-risk managers than for non-risk managers in the most adverse states 
of the world.69 Consequently, there exists the possibility of conflicts between different corporate 
targets that have to be taken into account when determining the risk management strategy. They can 
be avoided through the selection of appropriate hedging instruments that are independent of each 
other and can thus be employed to hedge di fferent objective values.70 
                                                   
68  Hu (1996), p. 44. 
69  Basak/Shapiro (1999). 
70  Graham/Smith (1996), p. 11, Smith (1995), p. 27, Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1993), p. 1640.  
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3.2  Positive Risk Management Theories and Empirical Evidence 
3.2.1  Agency Costs 
3.2.1.1  Underinvestment and Asset Substitution Problems 
Agency theory has had a strong impact on research in financial economics.71 The analysis of the rela-
tionship between a principal (e.g. a shareholder) and an agent (e.g. a manager) has led, in many 
ways, to new explanations of economic problems. Central elements of the analysis are the interde-
pendence of different interests, sets of information and alternatives of action for different parties as 
well as the optimal design of their relationships through incentive structures and contracts. Regarding 
the contribution of corporate risk management to shareholder value, the agency costs that result from 
the contractual relationship between shareholders on the one hand and debtholders, managers and 
employees on the other hand are of foremost interest. 
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders can especially arise when a firm 
has high financial leverage and when firm value is volatile. While it is in principle optimal to realize 
investment projects with positive net present value and to reject those with negative NPV, managers 
who act in the interest of shareholders may not realize all profitable investment projects in the face of 
high leverage (underinvestment problem or debt overhang problem).72 This is because firm value is 
volatile (also due to financial risks), and increases in value generally have to be used to satisfy deb-
tholders first. Therefore, low firm value and high leverage can even lead to the rejection of profitable 
                                                   
71  Jensen/Meckling (1976), Eisenhardt (1989), Arrow (1985), Hacket (1985), Jensen/Smith (1985), Pratt/Zeckhauser 
(1985), Jensen (1983), Fama (1980), Ross (1973). 
72  MacMinn (1987a), p. 670, Myers (1977).  
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projects, if the success of the investment primarily increases the probability that the debt can be re-
paid, but does not largely benefit equity holders (as in the case of low leverage and high firm value). 
This underinvestment problem is more important as more investment projects/growth options are 
avai lable.73 
Corporate risk management represents a means to eliminate or alleviate these conflicts of in-
terest and the associated welfare loss resulting from realized value-increasing investments by reducing 
the volatility of firm value. As a consequence, situations of low firm value, in which the conflict of 
interest occurs, arise less often, and shareholder value increases due to avoided agency costs. At the 
same time, benefits from additional tax shields of a higher optimal debt ratio exist which are not com-
pletely compensated by higher agency costs.74 
If hedging is apt to reduce the underinvestment problem, one would expect that risk manage-
ment activities can be observed more often or to a larger extent for companies with a high debt ratio, 
many investment projects and growth options. As indicators for the available investment set, various 
ratios such as R&D/sales, Tobin's q, capital expenditure/total assets, book value of equity/market 
value of equity, book value of equity/total assets, or the price/earnings ratio can be used. Empirical 
studies do indeed find evidence for these relationships.75 Moreover, companies in more regulated 
                                                   
73  Numerical examples are presented in Smithson (1998), pp. 510-512, Dobson/Soenen (1993), pp. 37-39, 
Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990a), p. 134. 
74  Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990a), p. 135. Smith/Watts (1992), pp. 269-272, show that companies with large 
growth options have lower debt ratios and lower dividends. 
75  Graham/Rogers (1999), p. 20, Fehle (1998), p. 15, Howton/Perfect (1998), pp. 117-118, Schrand/Unnal (1998), pp. 
1003-1010, Haushalter (1997), pp. 22-30, Samant (1996), p. 52, Dolde (1995), Goldberg et al. (1994), p. 14, Fran-
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industries are less likely to hedge since regulation reduces the importance of the underinvestment 
problem.76 
The interests of shareholders and debtholders are diverging as well because the shareholders 
of a leveraged firm have a strong interest in taking on very risky projects (asset substitution problem 
or risk shifting problem).77 This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the residual claims of 
shareholders can be interpreted as a call option on the assets of the firm.78 However, in general, 
there is a positive relationship between the value of an option and the volatility of the underlying as-
set. Consequently, the realization of risky investment projects increases the value of the shareholders’ 
position (possibly even if the project has a negative NPV) since the volatility of firm value increases. 
The incentive to pursue this wealth transfer is even stronger when corporations carry excessive 
                                                   
cis/Stephan (1993), p. 625, Lewent/Kearney (1990), p. 25. Mian (1996), p. 430, finds converse results. The study 
by Tufano (1996), pp. 1116-1118, shows significant results for the debt ratio, but not for variables representing 
investment opportunities. The study by Dolde (1993b), p. 35, however, cannot identify significant differences 
in the debt ratio of users and non-users of derivatives. In the studies by Nance/Smith/Smithson (1993), pp. 273-
284, Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1334-1339, Guay (1999), p. 341-346, investment variables, but not the 
debt ratio are significant. Berkman/Bradbury (1996), pp. 10-12, find si gnificance for the debt ratio and earnings 
per share. The study by Allayannis/Weston (1997), p. 17, documents empirical evidence for a positive relation-
ship between firm value and the usage of derivatives. Gay/Nam (1998), pp. 62-66, find evidence for several 
growth variables. In addition, firms with high growth opportunities hedge more if their cash stock is low. 
76  Mayers/Smith (1982), p. 292, Guay (1999), p. 348, Mian (1996), p. 430, Goldberg et al. (1994), p. 14. 
77  MacMinn (1987a), pp. 672-675, Jensen/Meckling (1976), pp. 334-337. 
78  Similarly, the position of debtholders resembles a combination of a riskless bond and a short put (Ma-
son/Merton (1985), pp. 14-19).  
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amounts of debt, as the call option of the shareholders has only its time value left (OTM or ATM 
option).79 
Agency costs occur in this situation due to the justified attempts of debtholders to block the 
wealth transfer. Creditors have ex ante of two ways to proactively deal with the potential for oppor-
tunistic behavior on the part of the shareholders. First, they can demand a higher compensation for 
supplying debt capital by discounting the underinvestment and/or asset substitution problem into the 
fair price of debt.80 Second, they can impose debt covenants in order to put restrictions on the in-
vestment and financing policies.81 Debt covenants are welfare reducing as they limit the degrees of 
freedom of management and possibly obstruct the realization of profitable, yet risky investment alter-
natives.82 
Corporate hedging contributes to the reduction or avoidance of these agency costs if it lowers 
the riskiness of investment projects. As a result, both groups of suppliers of capital have an interest in 
realizing the (less risky) investment if the NPV is positive.83 In this context, it is important to realize 
that firms have to credibly pre-commit on a hedging strategy in order to achieve the potential benefits 
of corporate risk management i n terms of reduced agency costs. Without the ability to do so, the 
gains from risk management at the firm level will be smaller. Firms might be able to credibly commit 
                                                   
79  For numerical examples refer to Dobson/Soenen (1993), p. 39. 
80  Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990c), p. 374. 
81  Mayers/Smith (1987), Mayers/Smith (1982), p. 287, Smith/Warner (1979). 
82  Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), pp. 156-158, Smith/Warner (1979), pp. 125-131. 
83  Bessembinder (1991), Campbell/Kracaw (1990), p. 1684.  
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to a hedge through established reputation (e.g. resulting from a bond rating), or by defining their risk 
management strategy in debt covenants.84 
In order to analyze the impact of risk management on the asset substitution problem empiri-
cally, the violation of debt covenants in the presence of financial risks can be studied. Empirical tests 
show that hedging is indeed used to reduce the risk of breaking a covenant.85 Since convertible debt, 
preferred stocks or mortgage bonds represent substitutes for risk management with regard to the 
underinvestment problem and the asset substitution problem, companies using these instruments 
should be less likely to engage in (other) risk management activities.86 Nevertheless, there is no em-
pirical evidence supporting this hypothesis.87 
3.2.1.2  Divergent Risk Preferences and Management Compensation 
Another potential source of agency costs consist of the fact that managers, while principally acting in 
the interest of shareholders whose agents they are, pursue personal goals as well. This aspect is even 
more relevant since managers typically have a quite undiversified wealth position due to their em-
ployment in the firm, the associated contemporary and future income and non-monetary utility com-
                                                   
84  Smithson (1998), pp. 507-513, Smith (1995), Bessembinder (1991). 
85  Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1328, Francis/Stephan (1993), p. 625. 
86  Smithson (1998), p. 508. 
87  Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1336-1338, Nance/Smith/Smithson (1993), pp. 273-284. Goldberg et al. (1994), 
p. 14, find only weak empirical evidence for preferred stock as a substitute for hedging.  
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ponents such as reputation, awards, promotions etc. Consequently, they are particularly interested in 
considering their personal preferences towards risk in corporate risk management.88 
However, it can be argued that the risk preferences of shareholders and managers are not 
completely different. The former are primarily interested in increases in shareholder value. Since cor-
porate risk management contributes to firm value via reduced cash flow volatility, as postulated in this 
paper, increases of shareholder value and reduction of risk are still congruent objectives from the 
perspective of the owners. However, while corporate managers may often be risk averse due to their 
undiversified personal wealth position, in most cases they cannot sell the stock of their firm short in 
order to reduce the riskiness of their private portfolio. As a result, they have not only a special inter-
est in the ongoing existence of the firm, but also have an incentive to reduce their personal exposure 
by means of corporate hedging.89 
Thus, there is a basis for potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers 
who make corporate risk management or, more generally, the investment and financing policy of the 
firm subject to their personal attitude towards risk. However, the realization of the managers’ risk 
preferences aims eventually at the reduction of corporate risk in order to avoid bankruptcy. There-
fore, this strategy could lead to a hedging strategy and thus to an increase in shareholder value which 
would have resulted from the exclusive pursuit of shareholders' interests as well.90 Nevertheless, 
                                                   
88  Stulz (1990), Stulz (1984), Mayers/Smith (1982), p. 283. 
89  Santomero (1995), p. 2. Sercu/Uppal (1995), p. 459, and Miller/Reuer (1994), p. 7, note that a personal hedge 
does not usually have the appropriate duration corresponding to the exposure. 
90  Moreover, corporate hedging of firm value has the advantage that no or only small risk premia have to be paid 
to managers (and other ill-diversified stakeholders like customers, suppliers, employees) for taking on undiver-
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there also exist forms of risk reduction such as operative diversification of businesses (conglomerate 
diversification) which are associated with a loss in value for the owners and which are thus not in 
their interest but in that of management only. 91 
In this context, the impact of incentive structures in general and management compensation in 
particular has to be taken into account as well.92 If accounting targets are chosen to evaluate the 
performance of management for want of better, objective criteria, conflicts of interest are possible 
simply because the use of accounting information induces a short-term perspective. Moreover, it 
stimulates the pursuit of targets -- apart from or in addition to the objective to avoid bankruptcy -- 
which may not or only indirectly contribute to the maximization of firm value and the reduction of its 
exposure.93 On the other hand, components of management compensation with option features, such 
as stock options, can lower managers‘ risk aversion and even induce speculative behavior. 
Shareholders can try to resolve management's conflict of interest through suitable incentive 
structures. By linking the compensation and evaluation of managers appropriately to the stock price, 
they can insure that corporate policies take shareholder value into account and that risk reducing, 
                                                   
sified risks (Section 3.2.2.1). 
91  Allayannis/Weston (1997), p. 17, Denis/Denis/Sarin (1997), Berger/Ofek (1995), Comment/Jarrell (1995), 
Levi/Sercu (1991), p. 32, Amihud/Lev (1981), p. 606. 
92  Han (1996), Campell/Kracaw (1987), Smith/Stulz (1985), pp. 399-403. 
93  Franke (1992), Hacket (1985), p. 167. The fact that management compensation is quite often tied to accounting 
data is also an explanation for the strong importance accounting exposure still has in business practice, (De-
Marzo/Duffie (1995), p. 744). Linking management salaries to market movements/values is a preferred solution 
from this perspective.  
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value destroying strategies on part of the management are mostly avoided. Corporate risk manage-
ment represents, therefore, a means to avoid conflicts of interest between management and share-
holders.94 
Incentive structures, however, are only effective if managers perceive themselves in a position 
to have an impact on the relevant factors in order to steer the development purposely.95 Since the 
origin of financial risks is outside management’s control, there often does not exist a clear link be-
tween corporate policies a nd corporate performance, which diminishes the effectiveness of the 
incentive structures in place. In this context, corporate hedging could create value by eliminating the 
erratic influence of financial risks, thus increasing the correlation between corporate performance and 
management strategy, which in turn renders the incentive structures more effective. At the same time, 
shareholders can more easily distinguish between good and bad management skills. As a conse-
quence, good managers, to which their (good) reputation is an important asset, have a strong incen-
tive to communicate their skills by hedging effectively. Conversely, it can be advantageous for less 
qualified managers to make a correct assessment of their performance more difficult through the dis-
torting effect of financial risks.96 
The results of empirical studies support the hypothesis that corporations are less likely to con-
duct risk management and that they hedge less, the more important stock options are for manage-
                                                   
94  Stulz (1984), p. 136. The holding of stocks of the company they work for, however, worsens the diversification 
problem of managers. 
95  Smith (1995), p. 26. 
96  Stulz (1996), p. 19, Breeden/Viswanathan (1996), Degeorge/Moselle/Zeckhauser (1996), DeMarzo/Duffie (1995), 
Ljungqvist (1994).  
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ment compensation.97 In addition, there is some evidence for a positive statistical relationship be-
tween the equity investment of management in their own company and corporate hedging activities, 
not withstanding the problem of assessing the relative importance of company stocks for the wealth 
of managers due to the lack of information on their private financial situation. 98 Moreover, empirical 
evidence exists for corporate hedging as an indicator for good management skills.99 
3.2.2  Transaction Costs 
3.2.2.1  Costs of Financial Distress 
Since the future cash flows of a firm are subject to uncertainty, situations can arise where the liquidity 
available does not suffice to fulfill all contractually fixed obligations of a period (like wages and inter-
est on debt) that accrue independently of the profitability or solvency of a firm. If payment obligations 
cannot or are expected not to be met fully and timely, transaction costs of financial distress originate 
                                                   
97  Schrand/Unal (1998), pp. 1008-1010, Haushalter (1997), pp. 24-31, Tufano (1996), pp. 1116-1129. G é-
czy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1334-1336, and Gay/Nam (1998), pp. 62-66, find a negative relationship between 
the extent of hedging and stock options held by managers. They explain this result with the fact that certain 
features of stock options (e.g. long-term, initial at-the-money strike price, tendency to replace out-of-the-money 
options) make their expected payoffs similar to that of common stocks. See Core/Guay (1999) regarding proxies 
for the incentive effects of options. 
98  Graham/Rogers (1999), p. 20, Schrand/Unnal (1998), pp. 1003-1010, Tufano (1996), pp. 1116-1129, May (1995), 
pp. 1302-1304, find indications for a positive relationship; G éczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1334-1340, and 
Haushalter (1997), pp. 25-31, however, do not. 
99  Adam (1997), p. 21, Degeorge/Moselle/Zeckhauser (1996), pp. 21-24.  
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due to illiquidity.100 The expected costs of financial distress are generally determined by the actual 
size of the cost and the probability of getting into a situation of illiquidity. 101 
Regarding the size of the cost of financial distress, both the less obvious indirect as well as the 
direct costs have to be taken into account. If a corporation encounters liquidity problems, primarily 
indirect costs will originate at first due to the negative influence on explicit or implicit contracts with 
customers, suppliers, employees and creditors.102 If these stakeholders have an important business 
relationship with the firm, they are particularly dependent on its future existence due to their low de-
gree of diversification (similar to ill-diversified owners e.g. of private businesses).103 
Financial distress affects the relationship with customers primarily in cases where companies 
produce goods for which service and warranties are very important. Customers perceive liquidity 
problems as an indication that these services may not be available with certainty, making them less 
valuable to them. Liquidity problems are also detrimental to the sale of products whose quality is 
hard to assess before using them. With these experience goods, often other aspects become crucial 
factors for the assessment of product quality, and payment problems may reduce customers’ trust 
and thus their willingness to buy a product.104 
                                                   
100 Myers (1977), p. 148. 
101 Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990b), pp. 368-370, Rawls/Smithson (1990), p. 10. 
102 Shapiro/Titman (1986). 
103 Stulz (1996), p. 13, Mayers/Smith (1982), pp. 283-288. 
104 Stulz (2000b).  
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In addition, financial distress has a negative impact on the sourcing of the firm, because suppli-
ers offer less attractive payment conditions to customers with financial problems. Furthermore, sup-
pliers are less willing to adjust their production schedules and capacities to the needs of customers 
whose distressed financial situation indicates a possibly limited future existence in the market. The 
resulting costs of financial distress are bigger the smaller the number of potential suppliers is. 
Moreover, the threat of bankruptcy induces the employees of a firm to demand a premium 
from their employer for the risk of losing their job and/or some of their income. By the same token, a 
higher turnover may result, causing costs for searching and training new workers. Other indirect costs 
generally arise because the attention of management and employees is distracted from value-
increasing activities and profitable investment opportunities.105 Situations of financial distress can thus 
lead to a permanent loss of reputation and human capital.106 
Direct costs of financial distress arise for lawyers' fees and other legal expenses primarily when 
entering into the stage of bankruptcy. But even before this point, illiquidity can induce higher costs 
due to, for example, higher financing costs as a result of a lower credit rating.107 
Corporate risk management does not have an immediate effect on the absolute size of direct 
and indirect costs of financial distress. Nevertheless, it can significantly reduce the probability of such 
                                                   
105 Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), p. 154. 
106 Shapiro/Titman (1986), Warner (1977a). 
107 Stulz (1996), p. 12. Direct bankruptcy costs are the core of the original argument developed by Smith/Stulz 
(1985), pp. 395-399. Even though these cost of financial distress are more obvious, their empirical importance 
relative to firm value is rather small, (Weiss (1990), Warner (1977b)).  
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a situation as companies are more likely to encounter financial distress the higher their fixed payment 
obligations and the more volatile their cash flows are. Value increasing risk management reduces the 
probability of financial distress by reducing the volatility of cash flows, thus lowering the expected 
costs of financial distress, which are the product of the probability of such a situation occurring, and 
the associated costs (Figure 8). 
[Figure 8] 
While the reduction of financial distress costs increases firm value already  per se, it augments 
shareholder value even further by simultaneously raising the firm’s potential to carry debt.108 This 
follows from the fact that interest payments of debt (contrary to dividend payments) are generally 
made out of pre-tax income (tax shields of debt financing). As the sum of payments to shareholders 
and debtholders increases with higher financial leverage, from this perspective the firm should take on 
as much debt as possible.109 
However, the cost of financial distress increases with a higher debt ratio as well, overcompen-
sating the benefit of tax shields from some (optimal) degree of leverage on.110 As discussed above, 
corporate risk management lowers the cost of financial distress, which leads to a higher optimal debt 
ratio (or lower financing costs), and the tax shields of the additional debt capital further increases the 
value of the firm V (Figure 9). 
                                                   
108 Ross (1996). 
109 For empirical results on the relationship between taxes and financing decisions refer e.g. to MacKie-Mason 
(1990a). 
110 Myers (1993), p. 5, Myers (1986), pp. 94-99, Myers (1984), pp. 577-581.  
  37
[Figure 9] 
Overall, studies of the impact of hedging on firm value support the argument of financial dis-
tress cost. Most of them find an empirical relationship between corporate risk management activities 
and the probability of bankruptcy of a firm, which is measured, for i nstance, by the variables debt 
ratio (leverage), interest coverage, or rating. 111 The risk of financial distress is also higher the more 
volatile the cash flows, the stronger the dependence on business cycles and the greater the operating 
leverage is.112 Since the indirect costs of financial distress are disproportional to the size of the firm, 
they are ceteris paribus of higher i mportance to small firms than to large ones (relative to firm 
value).113 This fact is reflected in the result that the extent of hedging and the size of the firm (market 
value of equity or total assets) are negatively correlated.114 
                                                   
111 Graham/Rogers (1999), pp. 18-19, Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1999), pp. 39-42, Guay (1999), pp. 341-346, Gay/Nam 
(1998), pp. 62-66, Howton/Perfect (1998), pp. 117-118, Haushalter (1997), pp. 23-30, Tufano (1996), pp. 1116-1118, 
Berkman/Bradbury (1996), pp. 9-12, Samant (1996), p. 52, Francis/Stephan (1993), p. 625, Goldberg et al. (1994), 
p. 14. G éczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1334-1336, and Nance/Smith/Smithson (1993), pp. 273-279, do not find 
unambiguous results; the effects in Dolde (1993b), p. 35, and Block/Gallagher (1986), p. 75, are not statistically 
significant. Wall/Pringle (1989), p. 68, and Mayers/Smith (1990), p. 38, confirm the negative relationship be-
tween rating and hedging. 
112 Guay (1999), p. 341-346, Dolde (1993a), p. 29, Samant (1996), pp. 52-55. 
113 Warner (1977b), p. 345. 
114 Gay/Nam (1998), pp. 62-66, Haushalter (1997), p. 30, Dolde (1995), p. 201, Dolde (1993b), p. 34, Mayers/Smith 
(1990), p. 38.  
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3.2.2.2  Cost of Hedging  
For corporate risk management to be a value-increasing activity, the resulting benefit (to the share-
holders) has to be larger than the cost associated with hedging leading to a net increase in firm value. 
Nevertheless, even in imperfect and inefficient capital markets, the economic transaction costs of 
hedging appear often to be almost negligible.115 They manifest themselves e.g. as transaction costs 
(bank charges, fees, etc.) or as various opportunity costs. 
The higher bid/ask spreads in the forward market compared to the spot market represent 
hedging costs as well. They are relatively small, though, as only the difference between the transac-
tion costs of a spot and a forward transaction is relevant. The larger size of the bid/ask spreads in the 
forward market is a result of lower liquidity compared to the spot market because of which open 
positions cannot be closed out as quickly in the forward market. The risk of an unfavorable change 
until the position is hedged leads to the larger bid/ask spread (and not potential rate changes over the 
maturity of the forward contract). Especially for short maturities, however, almost no noticeable di f-
ferences in the liquidity of both markets exist.116 
In contrast, the differences between forward and spot exchange rates principally do not repre-
sent hedging costs, but reflect the different interest rates in the relevant countries (interest rate parity). 
In the same vein, according to the unbiased forward rate theorem, the forward rate is equal to the 
expected spot rate at the maturity of the forward contract, so that deviations of the two rates are 
determined by chance and will equal out in the long run, or represent risk premia in the case of sys-
                                                   
115 Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), p. 151, Rawls/Smithson (1990), p. 17. 
116 Levi (1996), pp. 366-371, Shapiro (1996), p. 254, Smith (1995), p. 27.  
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tematic deviations. When using puts and calls, option premia have to be paid to purchase the instru-
ment. The option price, however, does not represent hedging costs since it equals the expected pay-
off of the option contract. Taking the option premium into account, the expected gain of the option 
contract is zero. Overall, transaction costs of hedging generally do not seem to be economically sig-
nificant. 
Empirical studies are often able to identify a positive correlation between corporate hedging or 
the use of derivatives and the size of a firm (market value of equity, total assets).117 This result can be 
explained by the fact that -- in addition to or apart from the direct costs of hedging transactions -- 
fixed costs of corporate risk management for information services, employees and know-how accrue 
as well, with regard to which large companies can realize economies of scale.118 
Most benefits of corporate risk management result from its effect on corporate cash flows and 
can thus not be achieved at all by shareholders hedging on their own accounts. However, if there are 
benefits of risk management that can be accomplished with hedging by either the firm or investors, 
hedging on the corporate level has to be the least expensive way to accomplish this effect in order to 
                                                   
117 Berkman/Bradbury (1999), p. 17, Graham/Rogers (1999), pp. 17-20, Fehle (1998), p. 15, G éczy/Minton/ 
Schrand (1997), pp. 1336-1338, Guay (1999), p. 346-348,  Haushalter (1997), p. 29, Adam (1997), p. 21, 
Hentschel/Kothari (1997), p. 14, Mian (1996), p. 431, Berkman/Bradbury (1996), pp. 9-12, Goldberg et al. (1994), 
p. 14, Dolde (1993b), p. 34, Nance/Smith/Smithson (1993), pp. 273-275, Francis/Stephan (1993), pp. 625-364, 
Block/Gallagher (1986), p. 75, Booth/Smith/Stolz (1984), p. 17. 
118 Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1331-1333, Haushalter (1997), p. 29, similarly Dolde (1993b), pp. 34-36. This 
idea is supported also by the observation that the usage of foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives are 
highly correlated, Goldberg et al. (1994), p. 15.  
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be justified on economic grounds.119 This could be the case if corporations have a comparative cost 
and/or information advantage. 
In light of the fact that capital markets are dominated by large institutional investors and not by 
individual private investors, corporations have neither advantages in the form of economies of scale 
when implementing a hedge nor generally better access to hedging instruments and markets. Due to 
their business relationships with other companies, nonfinancial corporations have certain methods of 
hedging like leading, lagging  or transfer pricing.120 Institutional investors, however, can already 
achieve hedging through their portfolio selection and realize diversification benefits with regard to 
unsystematic risk. Private investors can take advantage of these effects at low cost by investing in 
mutual funds of institutional investors. Therefore, corporations do not seem to have cost advantages 
regarding the realization of hedging strategies. 
Nevertheless, effective and efficient risk management also requires comprehensive and in 
depth knowledge of the size and structure of the corporate financial exposure. Detailed information 
on the assets (production and investment planning, current and future prices, costs, sales, etc.) as 
well as the liabilities (e.g. currency denomination) is a necessary prerequisite for the exposure as-
sessment. Since companies often do not disclose the information necessary to quantify a firm’s expo-
sure, information asymmetries between management and investors exist. Investors gain insight into 
the corporate exposure and risk management activities only by way of constant monitoring, and thus 
                                                   
119 Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), p. 144. 
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at higher costs. Because of the information advantage of managers, risk management can in most 
cases be conducted considerably more efficiently at the firm level.121 
Moreover, since firms typically have important proprietary information, there are benefits of 
corporate risk management to the shareholders that cannot be achieved by investors hedging on their 
own. In particular, if shareholders do not have complete information about the risks of a firm, they 
are not able to construct optimally diversified portfolios. Therefore, corporate hedging can be benefi-
cial to shareholders if it reduces the volatility and thus the noise of a firm’s payoff. Consequently, 
corporate risk management should be aimed at stabilizing the exposure in order to allow investors an 
optimal portfolio allocation without having to adjust their portfolio permanently at the expense of 
transaction costs.122 
The results of empirical studies present weak evidence that companies are more likely to 
hedge if the information asymmetries are large between management and shareholders. In this con-
text, it is assumed that there is a higher availability of information the larger the proportion of share-
holdings with institutional investors and the higher the number of analysts follo wing the firm. 123 
                                                   
121 Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), p. 150, Sercu/Uppal (1995), p. 458. Rawls/Smithson (1990), p. 16, and Hakkarainen/Kasa-
nen/Puttonen (1994), p. 23, note that the data disclosed in annual reports does not suffice to assess the corpo-
rate exposure. On this issue, see also Raposo (1996). 
122 Hu (1996), p. 49, Mason (1996), p. 179, Giddy (1994), p. 156. Hedging can be perceived in this context as an 
(imperfect) substitute for disclosure of corporate exposure as it serves to improve the market’s assessment of 
the firm as well, (DeMarzo/Duffie (1995), pp. 744-746, Fite/Pfleiderer (1995), p. 162, Ljungqvist (1994), De-
Marzo/Duffie (1991), p. 263). 
123 Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1330-1336. Graham/Rogers (1999), p. 17, report converse results.  
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3.2.3  Coordinating Financing and Investment Policies 
Another argument in favor of corporate risk management consists of increases of shareholder value 
that can be generated in the presence of imperfect capital markets if corporate investment and 
financing policies are coordinated more efficiently by means of risk management.124 The underlying 
idea for this theory is the fact that the value of a firm can be enlarged by realizing investment projects 
with positive NPV. Profitable projects, however, can only be taken on if their financing is secured. 
Because of the volatility of corporate cash flows originating from financial risks, the financing of the 
optimal investment program from internal funds is not guaranteed at every point in time, though. 
Consequently, the volatility of cash flows induces volatility to the investment program and/or 
the external financing. With decreasing marginal return of capital, adjusting the financing to the opti-
mal investment program is generally preferred over modifying the investment schedule. Since there 
exist, however, increasing marginal costs of external financing due to capital market imperfections, 
raising additional capital is also disadvantageous. In imperfect capital markets, external debt as well 
as equity financing is associated with various transaction and agency costs which lead to an increas-
ing marginal cost curve. 
The issuance of equity to raise capital is costly primarily because of existing information asym-
metries with regard to a fair stock price between the management within the company and the inves-
tors in the capital market. Since management has important inside information, investors generally 
assume that managers who act in the interest of the old shareholders issue new equity only if they 
believe the shares to be overvalued, because a wealth transfer from old shareholders to new share-
                                                   
124 Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1994), Froot (1994), Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1993), Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1989).  
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holders would result in the case of an undervaluation.125 Consequently, the issuance of new shares is 
typically perceived as a negative signal in the capital market, often leading to a reduction in stock 
price.126 
External debt financing  -- especially for firms with a credit rating -- is associated with fewer 
problems with respect to asymmetric information, which is why it is often preferred over issuing new 
shares. Nevertheless, transaction costs arise in the form of direct and indirect costs of financial dis-
tress when raising external debt. Agency costs originating from the rel ationship between creditors 
and shareholders can be reduced by means of debt covenants which, however, at the same time limit 
the degrees of freedom for future financing or investment. These factors lead to increasing marginal 
cost of debt financing and possibly to limitations of future funding (credit rationing).127 In addition, 
transaction costs like bank fees, syndication fees, etc. accrue with both types of external financing. 
Due to the increasing marginal cost of external financing, corporations generally choose internal 
financing over debt financing, and they prefer debt financing to external equity financing.128 Therefore, 
a lack of internal liquidity leads to higher cost of capital and/or opportunity costs, because of costly 
external funding or because of passed up opportunities to increase firm value. In the presence of 
financial risks causing volatility of corporate cash flows, corporate risk management can create value 
                                                   
125 Myers (1993), p. 7, Myers/Majluf (1984), p. 188, Akerlof (1970). 
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to the shareholders by harmonizing the need for and the availability of internal funds. This coordina-
tion of investment and financing policies leads to increases in shareholder value, as it guarantees the 
realization of profitable investment projects while at the same time avoiding higher cost of capital.129 
The target variable for hedging, in this case, is the cash flow before investment spending. 
However, it has to be taken into account that not only cash flows, but possibly the need for funds 
and for investments are influenced by financial risk as well. To illustrate, for oil refining companies the 
cash flows as well as the attractiveness to explore new oil fields are determined by the price of crude 
oil. Because of the already existing positive correlation between the need of funds and their availabi l-
ity, hedging is needed to a much lesser degree than for a firm with constant investment require-
ments/opportunities.130 In both cases, though, the hedging of cash flows before capital expenditure 
leads also to a reduction in volatility of the net cash flows and thus of firm value. 
To empirically validate the impact of hedging on the coordination of investment and financing 
policies, the relationship between corporate risk management and liquidity, measured by the quick 
ratio ([liquid assets + securities + receivables]/short-term debt), the current ratio (short-term as-
sets/short-term debt), or the dividend payout, can be analyzed. The results show that companies with 
low liquidity (small quick ratio or current ratio) are more likely to hedge than companies with high 
liquidity.131 The ambiguous results with regard to dividends may be explained by the fact that on the 
                                                   
129 Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1993), p. 1631, similarly already Lessard (1991), p. 66. 
130 Froot/Scharfstein/Stein (1994), pp. 94-98. 
131 Graham/Rogers (1999), p. 18, Berkman/Bradbury (1999), p. 17, Howton/Perfect (1998), pp. 117-118, G éczy/ 
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one hand, the payout of high dividends restrains liquidity and thus implies hedging. On the other hand, 
however, the relationship between growth options and dividend payments is likely to be negative.132 
Moreover, there is empirical evidence for the underlying hypothesis of a negative correl ation between 
investment activity and free cash flow133 as well as of increasing marginal cost of external financing 
exhibit empirical evidence as well.134 By the same token, firms with a strong correlation between 
cash flow and investment expenses are naturally hedged and thus use less derivatives.135 
3.2.4  Taxes 
Another aspect of capital market imperfection that forms the basis for corporate risk management to 
increase shareholder value is taxes. If corporate income is subject to a convex tax code, the volatility 
of pre-tax income can be reduced by risk management, thus cutting the corporate tax bill.136 A con-
vex tax system exists in cases where the marginal tax rate increases progressively with taxable in-
come. The tax function can also be convex due to various tax rules and regulations. Limits on carry-
                                                   
132 Graham/Rogers (1999), p. 18, Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1999), pp. 39-42, Haushalter (1997), pp. 23-30, G é-
czy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1334-1339, Mian (1996), p. 434, Berkman/Bradbury (1996), pp. 10-12, Goldberg 
et al. (1994), p. 14, Nance/Smith/Smithson (1993), pp. 273-284, Francis/Stephan (1993), pp. 625-364. 
133 Hoshi/Kashyap/Scharfstein (1991), p. 46, Lewent/Kearney (1990), p. 25, Fazzari/Hubbard/Petersen (1988), p. 
160. 
134 Hoshi/Kashyap/Scharfstein (1991), p. 46, MacKie-Mason (1990b), pp. 92-98, Wall/Pringle (1989), p. 68, Faz-
zari/Hubbard/Petersen (1988), pp. 160-183. 
135 Gay/Nam (1998), pp. 62-66. 
136 This effect has been analytically described for the first time by Smith/Stulz (1985), pp. 392-395. For numerical 
examples refer e.g. to Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990a), pp. 129-132.  
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ing losses backward or forward, foreign tax credits, etc. can also (indirectly) induce convex charac-
teristics to the tax function, as they can not (or only later) be benefited from in case of low income or 
even losses.137 
In the presence of (directly or indirectly) convex tax regimes, changes in pre-tax income over 
several periods will lead to a higher corporate tax burden than a more stable income (Figure 10). 
The effect of risk management is stronger (a) the more convex the tax function, (b) the more volatile 
corporate income, and (c) the bigger the part of income is that falls into the convex part of the tax 
schedule.138 If there are transaction costs associated with hedging, they may not exceed a maximum 
of Hmax to make hedging on a net basis a value increasing activity. For the U.S., there are several 
studies indicating that the tax schedule is convex. 139 
[Figure 10] 
The results of empirical studies do not give a clear picture regarding the evidence of the tax ar-
gument. On one hand, there is evidence in support of a positive correlation between corporate risk 
management and tax regulations (investment tax credits, tax losses) as well as the probability of the 
appl ication of a progressive tax rate.140 On the other hand, the results of many studies do not give an 
                                                   
137 Graham/Smith (1996), p. 3, Smith (1995), p. 26, DeAngelo/Masulis (1980). 
138 Graham/Smith (1996), p. 9, Smith/Smithson/Wilford (1990b), pp. 363-367. Kale/Noe (1990) show, however, that 
under certain circumstances firm value can be reduced if hedging takes the personal taxation of shareholders 
into account. 
139 Wilkie (1988), Zimmermann (1983), Siegfried (1974). Santomero (1995), p. 3, states that the convexity of the tax 
regime has decreased due to changes in the tax regulation. See also Mason (1996), p. 178. 
140 Nance/Smith/Smithson (1993), pp. 275-284. Howton/Perfect (1998), pp. 117-118, find significance for a tax pro-
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indication of corporate risk management being a means to increase shareholder value since variables 
used to capture the convexity property of the tax regime often do not show significance (marginal tax 
rate, book value of carry forwards/total assets, investment tax credits).141 
Potential explanations for this result exist in the strong relationship between tax savings and 
other rationales why hedging increases firm value. There is also some empirical evidence that the tax 
benefit of increased debt capacity provides a much stronger incentive for firms to hedge than the 
incentive originating from tax function convexity.142 The tax argument would also be less important if 
the different determinants of tax savings were negatively correlated and e.g. corporations with high 
volatility of income were taxed in a more linear part of the tax function while less volatile income was 
taxed in a part of the tax function with high convexity. 143 
                                                   
gressivity dummy, but not for a tax loss dummy. In the study by Goldberg et al. (1994), p. 14, convexity vari-
ables, but not the variable for investment credits and loss carry-forwards exhibit significance. Berk-
man/Bradbury (1996), pp. 10-12, however, find empirical significance for loss carry-forwards. In the study by 
Berkman/Bradbury (1999), p 17, the tax loss variable is significant as well. 
141 Graham/Rogers (1999), p. 18, Géczy/Minton/Schrand (1997), pp. 1334-1336, Tufano (1996), p. 1116, find no sig-
nificance of tax variables, Haushalter (1997), p. 25, Francis/Stephan (1993), pp. 628-634, weak significance of tax 
variables. In the study by Mian (1996), p. 431, only the variable for foreign tax credits exhibits statistical signifi-
cance. 
142 Graham/Rogers (1999), p. 26. 
143 Graham/Smith (1996), pp. 9-12.  
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4 Conclusion 
Financial risks, which consist of unexpected changes in foreign exchange, interest rate and commod-
ity price changes, exist, because international parity conditions (Purchasing Power Parity, Interna-
tional Fisher Effect) hold at best in the long run. In principle, shareholders could hedge against these 
risks on their own account. Nevertheless, statistics on risk management practices indicate not only a 
significant growth of derivatives markets in general, but also an awareness of many nonfinancial firms 
with regard to these risks and their effects on corporate performance. As a matter of fact, a large 
number of firms engage in risk management activities including, but not limited to, the use of deriva-
tive financial instruments. Consequently, the question arises whether corporate risk management is 
consistent with shareholder value maximization. 
Several positive theories suggest corporate hedging at the level of the firm as a lever to in-
crease shareholder value on the basis of existing capital market imperfections. First, hedging at the 
firm level can reduce agency costs associated with underinvestment problems and asset substitution 
problems. By the same token, differences in the risk preferences of managers and shareholders can 
cause agency costs as well, which can be alleviated by the means of corporate risk management. 
Secondly, corporate hedging can increase shareholder value through the reduction of transac-
tion costs. By lowering the likelihood of bankruptcy, the expected cost of financial distress is re-
duced and the debt capacity is increased. At the same time, information asymmetries between man-
agement and investors may render hedging on the corporate level more effective and efficient due to 
internal and proprietary information. As the exposure can be managed much more easily and better 
from inside the company, corporate risk management enables investors to make better portfolio op-
timization decisions.  
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Thirdly, capital market imperfections cause the marginal cost of external financing to be i n-
creasing -- for debt as well as for equity capital. Consequently, a shortage of internal funds for in-
vestment projects results in either higher cost of capital or foregone profitable investment opportuni-
ties. Corporate risk management, however, can help coordinate investment and financing policies 
and thus harmonize the need and availability of funds. 
Fourth, risk management at the firm level (as opposed to risk management by stock owners) 
represents a means to increase firm value to shareholders in the presence of a convex corporate tax 
regime, because the average tax burden is lower for less volatile pre-tax income. While there is am-
ple and increasing empirical evidence for the theories of agency cost, transaction cost and increasing 
cost of external financing, only weak empirical support is typically found for the tax argument.  
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Table 1: Annual Volume and Open Interest of Commodity Futures and Options 
Volume (in 1000)  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Futures                         
Agricultural commodities              102,579  112,618  232,478  176,798 137,518  122,096  115,397 
Energy products  12,903  22,052  28,959  35,402 42,355  41,947  47,764  116,870  63,711  61,527  62,367 67,402  83,071  97,616 
Non-precious metals              34,140  46,570  45,917  46,924 55,981  54,151  63,054 
Precious metals  9,576  12,863  11,738  12,786 16,663  11,393  10,213  49,118  34,709  33,723  32,968 40,704  47,563  51,412 
                             
Options                         
Agricultural commodities              12,119  16,193  19,230  19,950 19,326  18,426  19,310 
Energy products  135  3,268  5,622  6,412 6,352  6,729  9,742  20,486  8,138  7,195  8,847 10,463  12,525  14,010 
Non-precious metals              2,465  4,040  3,887  3,026 4,042  2,669  4,195 
Precious metals  1,745  2,629  3,349  8,811 8,152  8,999  9,978  26,794  12,174  6,306  3,759 3,288  2,977  3,919 
                             
Open Interest (in 1000)  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Futures                             
Agricultural commodities              33,096  36,551  74,450  40,735 42,982  40,005  38,702 
Energy products              9,183  9,340  8,165  8,497 9,961  11,930  19,292 
Non-precious metals              7,284  9,088  7,746  7,499 7,847  9,030  10,844 
Precious metals              11,368  13,824  13,817  14,676 14,086  13,718  15,261 
                             
Options                         
Agricultural commodities              12,034  18,312  19,545  15,406 15,909  16,985  17,769 
Energy products              6,223  5,376  5,439  7,791 9,453  10,633  14,113 
Non-precious metals              3,599  5,552  5,550  3,932 3,769  2,866  3,815 
Precious metals              9,243  10,775  7,311  5,569 6,052  6,322  7,914 
Source: BIS (2000)  
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Source: BIS (1999). Data are as of year-end. OTC instruments are interest rate swaps, 
currency swaps (adjusted for reporting both currencies; including cross-currency interest 
rate swaps) and interest rate options (caps, collars and swaptions). Exchange-traded in-
struments are interest rate futures and options as well as currency futures and options.  
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Source: BIS (1999). Data are as of year-end. OTC instruments are interest rate swaps, 
currency swaps (adjusted for reporting both currencies; including cross-currency interest 
rate swaps) and interest rate options (caps, collars and swaptions). Exchange-traded in-
struments are interest rate futures and options as well as currency futures and options.  
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Source: FIA (1999). The data refers to options and futures contracts.  
  74













FX & IR & CP
31%
 
Source: Phillips (1995), p. 117. FX = foreign exchange rate risk, IR = interest 
rate risk, CP = commodity price risk.  
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Source: Price Waterhouse (1995), p. 14.  
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Source: Price Waterhouse (1995), p. 12.  
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Figure 7: The Effect of Hedging on Firm Value 







Figure 8: The Impact of Hedging on the Cost of Financial Distress 





















Figure 10: Impact of Hedging on the Corporate Tax Burden 
Vi(PT)   : pre-tax firm value in state of the world i
E[V,O]   : expected firm value after taxes without hedging
E[V,H]   : expected firm value after taxes with hedging
E[T,O]   : expected tax burden without hedging
E[T,H]   : expected tax burden with hedging












Source: Smith/Stulz (1985), p. 393.  
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